Abstract: During the last years air transport stakeholder's behaviors have witnessed deep modifications. Airlines competition has been exacerbated by economic downturns, while airport competition emerged as a result of the less governmental intervention in airport investments. The first result of this process is a mix-model adopted by EU airlines in the domestic market, which implies that network airlines have adopted few of the strategies that have guaranteed the establishment of the low fares carriers, while low cost carriers have been continuously increasing the number of major airport served. The volatility of the air transport deregulated market has been analysed in the scientific literature and these aspects can be perceived as further evidences of the increased volatility. In order to limit the negative effects of volatility in the EU market, air transport players have been sought manners to enhance stability. Airlines mergers or acquisitions, buyout of airport operator's shares by airlines, airport-airline partnership for ad-hoc infrastructure development or buyout of airport's shares by other airport operators are examples of this will for a greater stability of the system. This paper analyses all these aspects highlighting the pursuing of greater stability by the fragile EU air transport system.
INTEGRATION AND CONCENTRATION OF EUROPEAN AIR TRANSPORT MARKET

Introduction and Evolution of Air Carrier's Strategies
The demand for air traffic has always been growing very fast if compared with the demand for other transportation systems. Airline demand depends strongly on both endogenous an exogenous factors like wars, terrorism, fuel prices and economic scenarios. A growth in GWP results in more attitude towards economic exchanges and business travels; moreover the improved economic conditions have a favourable impact on the number of leisure trips. It has been demonstrated that air traffic concentration and airports accessibility are simple indicators to analyse the main trends in the air traffic industry. In this paper, the attention is focused on the number of movements (i.e. take-offs or landings) and on the number of destinations attainable from a sample of airports in five EU countries to analyse the level of congestion at these airports. It is not necessarily true that a high number of passenger handled results in high number of movements and, therefore, in airport congestion (Grebenšek and Magister, 2012) , indeed it is necessary to take into account variables such as airplane capacity, frequencies of flights and airlines' fleet mix.
Generally speaking, up to the second part of the 1990s there was a single scheduled airline for each European country operating international flights both intra-European and inter-continental. These carriers, which have been defined as flag carriers, operated in a limited competitive environment and operated hub-and-spoke networks with the operative base, or rather the hub, located in the capitals of each State. Full-service carriers use sophisticated hub-and-spoke networks in which each route (maybe unprofitable as such) contributes in feeding traffic to the network. The individual flights are interdependent feeder services and crew and aircraft are usually deployed according to complex rotation plans.
In this environment, the deregulation of the market and the privatisation of airlines have led to the rise of a more commercial airline behaviour due to the increased competition brought by new players entering the market. Low-cost airline companies emerged in Europe during the 1990s with the specific aim of operating short-haul services in a point-topoint network with a lower cost structure in order to pursue lower fares (Doganis, 2010) . Greater efficiency has been achieved through a wide number of factors: for example increased aircraft and crew utilisation and the use of single kind of single-class aircraft with higher seat density. Cost savings have also been achieved through selling tickets electronically to customers, new business strategies and direct negotiation with airport managers to obtain reductions in airport charges. LCCs often fly from uncongested, secondary or regional airport due to their lower fares and International Journal for Traffic and Transport Engineering, 2013, 3(2): 204 -219 
Fig. 1. European Air Traffic Trend
Source: EUROCONTROL the possibility to have shorter turn-around times. LCC place different demands on airport facilities than traditional carriers: They don't need business lounges or high levels of service of terminal facilities (checkin, baggage services and security checks); moreover they would like to obtain parking stands adjacent to the terminal to avoid the use of air bridges or fingers. The development of low-cost carriers during the last decade had a dramatic effect on the European airline market. Low-cost carriers are expected to grow their market share in short-haul services up to 25-35% (Francis et al., 2004) . Lowcost carriers maintain relationship with their base airport, stationing there planes in night stop, personnel and supporting services; thus establishing a connection lightly similar to that existing between hub and dominant scheduled airline.
Recently a convergence of the two business model has been observed. Ex flag carriers have undergone deeply reorganization processes in order to reduce the cost base, to be more competitive on the market and to offer lower fares in the liberalized market, while low cost carriers have increased the service quality standards or tend to adopt simple hubbing models (i.e. Aer Lingus, Air Berlin or Germanwings).
Ex flag carriers, in order to increase their market share, have enhanced the practice of airline alliances, because they are intent on increasing the number of passengers (Iatrou and Alamdari, 2005) . Two definitive characteristics of strategic alliances are exclusive memberships and a joint marketing entity (IATA). Airline alliances should be fostered by different factors, such as increased globalisation in air transport, increasing interaction, economic incentives for airline consolidation, liberalisation and anti-trust concerns. Many authors have studied the economic implication of airline consolidation; the findings show that total costs increase 20% slower than the total traffic generated by the merged airlines. Airline alliances take many forms and not only generate various benefits and risks to the members but also to other stakeholders such as passengers, communities and travel agencies. The alliances could result in new route options, extension of frequent flyers program (Fan et al., 2001 ) and common reservation systems and creation of new market shares. On the other hand, there could be a potential tendency for reduced both competition and level of services and higher fares. Historically alliances have been most evident in international aviation where the governments offered the airlines antitrust immunity for transoceanic alliances -for example the open skies agreements between US and European countries -that allows the partners to discuss schedules, fares and frequency of flights (Ash, 2002) .
Direct acquisition can be both in the form of a 100% ownership or in the form of a major shareholding (> 50%). Direct acquisition is less viable nowadays both for the huge amount of money implied and for legal restriction to foreign ownership posed by some countries (U.S. legislation provides a ceiling to foreign carriers owning a stake in US carriers).
Airline demand depends strongly on both endogenous and exogenous factors like wars, terrorism, fuel prices and economic scenarios. A growth in GWP results in more attitude towards economic exchanges and business travels; moreover the improved economic conditions have a favourable impact on the number of leisure trips. Some example of merging and alliances between scheduled carriers at European level are: 
Evolution of Airport's Strategies
The traditional view of most airports acting as natural monopolies is increasingly being questioned because of the improved forces of competition which have occurred after the airline liberalization and airport commercialization (Graham, 2004) . Airports have traditionally considered the airlines as their main customers as they have legal agreements and pay the aeronautical charges (landing fees, charge per passenger / ton. of freight, use of air bridges, air-traffic control, aircraft parking, etc.). The deregulation of the aviation industry led to more aggressive market strategies adopted by airports (Tretheway and Kincaid, 2005 Airport managers need to reconsider their business strategies to deal with low-cost airlines that propose a reduction in the amount they pay to use airport facilities as a prerequisite to start operations. At medium sized airports, for example, low-cost airlines could be attracted to use the spare capacity at under-utilized existing infrastructure but there is the danger that they would act as substitute for the scheduled airlines resulting in an economic loss to the airport operator. A feasible strategy should be providing unbundled services and offering a differentiated product (e.g. converting old structures into low-cost terminal facilities with lower fares per passenger carried) to different airline types as it has been done in some cases (Marseille, Geneva, etc.).
Vertical Integration Airport-Airline
The characteristics of airport's development strategies strongly depend on airlines' decision to operate services; for example low-cost airlines have forced airport revenues down thanks to their bargaining position during the negotiation with airport managers: LCC can decide to fly elsewhere unless discounts in charges or commercial incentives are not granted by the airport (Doganis, 2010; Graham, 2008 Vertical relationship between airport and airline may happen in these scenarios: privatization of hub airport (Lufthansa now holds 9% of shares in Frankfurt airport, thus being able to influence strategic and investment's decisions and to have control on airport's cost development policy), terminal expansion at hub airport (terminal 2 at Munich airport was built and operated by a joint company of Lufthansa and Munich airport; Lh wanted a feasible terminal layout to support his double-hub and spoke operations and T2 was also intended to become a premium facility for Star alliance members' passengers) or terminal expansion at a base airport (the low cost carrier commits itself to grant the airport a certain amount of passengers versus lease or rearrangement of airport's structures). The weak point of vertical integration consists in the potential rise to anticompetitive practices aimed at displacing competing airlines such as diminution of quality of service, potential discrimination, increasing charges, cross-subsidies between airport and airline. This could happen if the airport operator is allowed to control somehow at least one airline. Therefore international experience suggests that airport concessions should impose vertical separation between the airport and the airline (Serebrisky, 2003) .
Airport management have to evaluate both the volatility of low-cost market and the growth expectations before concluding airportairline agreements: long term agreements and investments in infrastructure to accommodate low-cost airlines must be assessed regarding the degree of risk that services may be withdrawn (Francis et al., 2004) . Airport management should be also aware of the necessity of equity issues between traditional and low cost carriers as the social and economic status of a region may be harmed if scheduled services are withdrawn. The volatility of traffic at an airport is defined as a percentage change around the long term, according to the following formula (Eq. (1)): 
Traffic is much more volatile both at secondary airports and in a deregulated environment than under strict regulation; the regulation cap prevents airlines from rapidly changing their routes, fares or frequency of service.
Analysis of Airport Concentration and Accessibility
The value of a national air network concentration gives information on the air traffic distribution among the different airports: a low value of concentration means that the air traffic is equally distributed between airports while the opposite suggests that the air traffic is gathered at a few airports. The former situation is typical of point to point network while the latter, in association with temporal coordination, is typical of a hub and spoke network.
In this paper, the attention is focused on the concentration at some European airports, evaluated with the help of the Gini coefficient. Given n observations of the variable X, if: . ,..., 1
The Gini Coefficient (R) is given by the following formula (Eq. (2)):
The Gini concentration index ranges between 0 and 1. If all takeoffs and landings were concentrated on a single airport, R would be equal to 1; if they were equally distributed between the airports, R would be equal to 0. A useful graphic representation of the Gini coefficient is the Lorenz curve (Fig. 2) , where x axe is the cumulative percentage of airport movements and y axe is the cumulative percentage of airports at a given country. As the distance between the straight line R = 1 and the curve grow, then, the Gini coefficient (R) grows too.
In this analysis airport data ranging from 2005 to 2009 in the five most significant European countries in terms of passengers carried and movements (France, Germany, Italy, UK and Spain) are taken into consideration. Smaller countries like Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland were discarded because they often have only one major airport, thus limiting the passengers' possibility to choice the departure airport. Two main criteria were used for analysing the traffic:
• in each country the ten airports with the highest number of passenger carried were considered significant; • it's possible to include further airports if they handle more than 4 million passengers in a year.
The airports considered significant for the analysis are summarized in Table 1 .
The data were taken from the Airports Council International (ACI) Report and from airports' or aviation-authorities' websites (AENA for Spain, CAA for UK and Enac and Assaeroporti for Italy). Table 2 shows the values of the Gini coefficient during the period analysed.
Any point of the Lorenz curve is the cumulative percentage of the total movements at a given
International Journal for Traffic and Transport Engineering, 2013, 3(2): 204 -219 number of airports considered. As could be derived from Table 2 , France is the European country with the highest value of the Gini coefficient. The Lorenz curve may have a dualistic interpretation: when the variable X grows, it is possible to get the percentage of movements handled by small-medium sized airports; a reduction in the X variable gives information on the movements' percentage handled by the biggest country airports. Fig. 3 shows the Lorenz curve for France in 2008: it shows that the 80% of the total movements is handled by the 40% of the French airports, while the remaining 20% of airports (notably the two biggest French airports, Paris Roissy and Orly) handles the 60% of movements. This is why the concentration value is quite elevated.
Fig. 2. Example of Lorenz Curve
Spain has the second highest value of the Gini coefficient. The three biggest airports in the (Fig. 4) .
Going further to Germany, it is possible to note that the distance between the straight line R = 1 and the Lorenz curve diminishes, so does the value of the Gini coefficient. In Germany, from January to July 2009, the airports of Frankfurt and Munich together handled almost 47% of the total movements (Fig. 5) . In UK, the 23% of airports (London Heathrow, London Gatwick and Manchester), handled the 51% of the total movements in 2008 (Fig. 6) .
Finally, Italy is the country with the lowest value of the Gini coefficient (only 0,38 in 2008) . This is because the two most important Italian airports (Rome Fiumicino and Milan Malpensa) together handle only 50% of the total movements (Fig. 7) . The Italian air transport network is, in conclusion, very spread and it is possible to notice that the concentration is still further diminishing. 
Lorenz Curve for UK (2008)
It can be observed that low-cost carriers, thanks to their lowest fares, underwent less severe losses or little gains in terms of movements and passengers carried than full service airlines. At the same time, the traffic at secondary airport remained quite unchanged while main hubs experiment strong traffic losses. Moreover, low cost carriers are going on opening new routes from underused secondary and regional airports, thus diminishing the concentration degree of the Italian air traffic network. This phenomenon is less remarkable in the other countries; Table 2 actually shows that the Gini coefficient remains quite steady in the period analysed, because the difference between movements and passenger carried in both main hubs and secondary airports is similar (both gained in 2007, both lost traffic in 2008 and 2009).
The second important index investigated in this paper is airport accessibility. This parameter refers to the number of destination which is possible to attain departing from a target airport. Again, the countries analysed are France, Germany, Italy, Spain and UK; two main criteria have been used to define the sample of significative airports:
• top six airports for each country with reference to the total movements handled; • significant percentage of low cost traffic. Table 3 shows the 30 airports chosen for this analysis.
The destinations attainable from these airports have been classified as domestic, i n te rc o n t i n e n t a l a n d c o n t i n e n t a l , considering the latter as the traffic having the EU countries and along with Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia as destinations. The destinations have been derived from airports web sites in the period of fall 2009 and the frequencies have not been considered. For International Airports intercontinental, continental and total accessibility has been evaluated, while for the remaining airports 
-X is the target airport; -Z is the airport with more destinations attainable; -Acc (Z) = 100; -n dest (Z) is the number of destination attainable from Z airport. This is only a simplified method to evaluate accessibility, because it doesn't take into account the influence of variables such as frequency of flights, GWP and number of passenger on board; the results obtained can, however, give precious information about the potential of a national air network (CERTeT, 2005) . and Spanish airports don't reach 65%, as can be seen in Table 4 .
Conclusions
Two important aspects of air transport market, namely the concentration of traffic in airports within a given country and the accessibility of airports, have been analysed in this paper. competition between airlines and further innovation. As a result, new strategies such as low cost airlines, alliances, airlines merging and vertical integration between airport and airlines have been emerged and developed.
With regard to airport operators, the main trend is the concentration of the ownership but any country has a different situation: for example, in Spain all airports are operated by the government thanks to AENA, in the UK one airport operator can owe more than one airport while in the other countries any airports has its own operator and the concentration consists in market shares exchanges and alliances between non competing airports. Talking about airlines, the main trend is again consolidation of ownership and market expansion through merging and buying. Talking about global service airlines acquired by a bigger one, often operating fleet and crews continue to operate with the original brand. Also low cost airlines are willing to consolidate their market power through acquisitions, but the acquired company's brand (often on the edge of bankruptcy) simply exits the market. Thus, airlines ownership concentration is high because there are only a few independent global carriers (namely 5). The phenomena known as vertical integration between airport and airline consists in deductions on airport fees, commercial alliances and financial aids to project and build new structures, in order to pursue the mutual will to attract passengers. Such relationship may also take place between state and airline, when the former pays the latter the operating costs, for example, to operate air connections to areas not easily attainable else-how or to operate from under-congested airports to reduce the congestion level at main hubs. The first analysis, developed using the Gini coefficient, showed that, among the countries examined, France has the highest value of the Gini coefficient, likely due to the high number of movements gathered at Paris. Moreover, in the period between the 2005 and the 2009 and referring to the examined sample, the Gini coefficient was quite steady with the only exception of Italy, where the concentration is diminishing: this fact could be related to the spreading presence of low-cost carriers at secondary airports, associated with a better reaction to the global economic downturn in these airports in comparison with the main Italian hubs. The accessibility analysis has been undergone taking into account only the number of destinations attainable from a given airport. It has been possible to demonstrate that intercontinental accessibility varies widely depending on the country examined and it does not appear correlated with the overall traffic in a specific airport. Further more interesting results should be obtained taking into consideration other variables, such as the frequency of flights.
